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Since 1999, divergences in international competitiveness led to an ac-
cumulation of current account deficits in the south and surpluses in
the north of the euro area. With the aid of macroeconometric mod-
e l s ,t h i sp a p e re s t i m a t e st h ee ff e c t so fa ne x i to fG r e e c eo ro fa l lg i -
ips countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) on the economies
of Slovenia and Serbia. An exit of one or more countries would affect
other economies via the trade channel and credit constraints. Euro area
members would additionally suffer from an increase of public debt due
to non-performing loans of the European Stability Mechanism and de-
valuations of public bonds purchased by the European Central Bank.
An exit of Greece alone would only marginally affect the economies of
SloveniaandSerbia.Anexitofall giips countriesoraeuroareabreak-
up would have dramatic negative consequences for output, unemploy-
ment and public finances.
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Introduction
After the foundation of the European Economic and Monetary Union
(emu) in 1999, the diverging competitiveness of the peripheral and the
core countries resulted in the accumulation of sizeable current account
imbalances.Atthesametime,somecountriesbuiltuplargestocksofpub-
lic debt. The countries, which lost international price competitiveness,
have now to undergo painful reforms aiming at restoring their competi-
tiveness.Duringthisperiod,domesticdemanddeclineswhichspillsover
to other countries via the trade channel. As the deficit countries became
unable to finance their public budgets via capital markets, the other euro
area countries, the European Central Bank (ecb) and the International
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MonetaryFund(imf)haveestablishedfinancialrescueplansandnewin-
stitutions, particularly the European Stability Mechanism (esm). While
the financial assistance is conditional on painful reform programs in the
recipient countries, the other eu countries have assumed large claims
and guarantees. If the recipient countries fail to repay the loans, pub-
lic debt in the donor countries would increase, necessitating restrictive
fiscal policies with negative short-run effects on domestic demand also
in these countries. Furthermore, banks are affected by a write-down on
theirholdingsofpublicbondsiftheyieldsofthesebondsrisesharplydue
to unsound fiscal policies of the respective countries. As a result, banks
may be forced to reduce their credit supply. As many banks are oper-
ating internationally, credit supply in other than the home countries of
t h er e s p e c t i v eb a n k sw o u l da l s ob ea ff e c t e d .S h o u l dt h er e f o r mp r o g r a m s
underway in the peripheral countries fail to restore international com-
petitiveness and the sustainability of public finances, one or more of the
respectivecountriesmighteventuallyhavetoleavetheeuroareainorder
to devaluate its currency and to increase competitiveness in this way.
In this paper, the macroeconomic consequences of different scenar-
ios regarding the future euro area development for Slovenia and Serbia
are determined by means of simulations with macroeconometric mod-
els for these economies. The choice of these countries enables interest-
ing insights. On the one hand, both countries are successor states of the
former Yugoslavia; hence they share common characteristics and a com-
mon economic and political heritage. However, already in the 1980s and
early 1990s they followed different reform paths which materialised in
a higher degree of economic openness and stronger trade relations with
the Western countries in Slovenia. For Serbia, Russia was traditionally
the main trade partner. Major differences between the two countries are
related to their size in terms of territory and population, as well as their
level of economic and social development (gdp per capita and size of
u n e m p l o y m e n t )( M e n c i n g e r2 0 0 1 ) .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,a l r e a d yi n2 0 0 4
SloveniabecameamemberoftheEuropeanUnion,andin2007itwasthe
first country from Central and Eastern Europe to introduce the euro as
legal tender. Being a euro area member state, Slovenia has assumed obli-
gations within the esm, and by its capital share it participates in the ecb
bond purchase programmes and in the payment system Target2. How-
ever, Slovenia came itself into troubles and may be forced to ask for esm
support, as due to the bursting of a housing and real estate bubble many
loans became non-performing, pushing Slovenian banks into liquidity
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problems.Duetothelowcapitalisation,theliquidityproblemturnedinto
severe solvency problems, and ultimately the government had to inject
large amounts of capital into the banking sector, which pushed public
debtup.Moreover,whenjoiningthe emu in2007,Sloveniagainedaccess
to large amounts of finance, while a clear strategy for using these funds
was missing. Serbia, on the other hand, is only a eu candidate country.
Hence,Serbiaisuntilnowoutsidethefiscalpolicyandfinancialarchitec-
ture of the eu in general and the euro area in particular. In both coun-
tries, a lax credit policy by private banks, fuelled by substantial cross-
border funding in the period preceding the crisis, led to a sharp rise in
the indebtedness of companies and private households. Debtors are now
facing difficulties to service the loans, resulting in a sharp increase of the
share of non-performing loans and debt write-offs.
Accumulation of Imbalances in the Euro Area
Since the foundation of the emu in 1999, three major imbalances built
up: (i) diverging competitiveness in the euro area, which intensified dur-
ing the financial crisis of 2008; (ii) a banking sector which has proven to
be under-capitalised and non-resilient against adverse shocks; (iii) high
indebtedness of both public and private sectors in some member coun-
tries. Due to the mutual interdependences, these three problems rein-
force each other, having resulted in a widespread confidence crisis. The
developments are driven by pessimistic expectations concerning the sol-
vency of the public and private sectors, respectively, in the crisis coun-
tries. This led to high interest rates in these countries. At the same time,
capitalfledintothosecountries,whichareperceivedas‘safehavens,’lead-
ing to historically low interest rates there. Due to high uncertainty, exag-
geratedpessimismmayeasilybecomeself-fulfilling.Thedivergingdevel-
opmentofunitlabourcostsamongtheeuroareamembercountriessince
1999 is one of the major, if not the single most important source of the
current problems. This has caused substantial current account deficits in
the countries with fast growing unit labour costs, mirrored by large sur-
pluses in the economies experiencing an improvement in their interna-
tionalpricecompetitiveness.Atthesametime,intheSouthernperipheral
countries public deficits and debt levels have swollen markedly (Roubini
2011).
Over a long period, these deviating trends had not been corrected by
either exchange rate or wage adjustments. For an uncompetitive econ-
omy, such an adjustment would imply either an external or an internal
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devaluation, both ways making the respective country’s exports cheaper
and imports more expensive. While Germany went through a prolonged
period of wage moderation and painful labour market reforms (Hartz
reforms), Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy (and also Ireland, although Ire-
land’s situation is not entirely comparable to the problems of the South-
ern countries) have increasingly fallen behind. Rigid labour markets
and nominal wage stickiness prevented the required adjustment in these
economies. When wages grow faster than labour productivity, unit wage
costs rise. If unit labour costs rise by more than in other countries, the
trade balance of the respective economy deteriorates.
The rising unit wage costs in the Southern periphery countries have
partly been driven by capital market failure. Interest rate differentials in
the euro area relative to Germany largely disappeared after the introduc-
tion of the euro, eliminating risk premia and inducing real estate and in-
vestmentboomsinthosecountrieswithstillhigherwageandpriceinfla-
tionandthusloworevennegativerealinterestrates.Theinflowofcapital
andlowcapitalcostsfacilitatedwageincreasesnotbackedbycorrespond-
i n gp r o d u c t i v i t yg a i n s .A si n t e r e s tr a t ed i ff e r e n t i a l sh a v ea p p e a r e da g a i n
during the financial crisis, a large part of these investments is no longer
profitable with increased capital costs.
The failure of capital markets to price in risk premia and the result-
ing allocation of capital towards uncompetitive economies and sectors is
probably itself the consequence of lacking credibility of fiscal rules and
regulatory failure in Europe. The Maastricht criteria were not effectively
imposedandlackedcredibilityrightfromthebeginning.Capitalmarkets
also seemed to conclude that the no-bailout rule would not hold up in
crises since the bankruptcy of a highly indebted member country would
be perceived by the eu to be even more costly. In this way, high debt cre-
ates a negative externality on other countries. Under these conditions in-
vestors were inclined to expect to get their money back in any case, mak-
ing government bonds an apparently very safe investment. Under these
circumstances,therewasnoneedtoincludeariskpremium,whichwould
haveincreasedinterestcostsinSoutherncountriesandcouldhavehelped
to impose market discipline and to restrain the tendency towards exces-
sive debt financing.
Scenarios of the Future Euro Area Development
In this section, four scenarios of the future euro area development are
delineated: a baseline scenario assuming that the current problems will
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be solved without the exit or default of any euro area member state, and
three more pessimistic scenarios.
Baseline. In the baseline scenario, it is assumed that the countries that
are currently confronted with structural problems manage to solve their
problems by implementing painful structural reforms. This implies that
investor confidence is restored with the support from the esm programs
and the implicit ecb guarantees through the commitment to buy any
amount of government bonds necessary to secure reasonable interest
rates and risk premia. The euro area countries decide to finance a fur-
ther haircut for Greece or additional re-capitalisations for the Spanish
banking sector if necessary. Under these conditions, the crisis countries
manage to implement structural reforms, resulting in a sustainable re-
duction of unit labour costs. This internal devaluation helps to restore
internationalpricecompetitiveness.Inaddition,thecountrieswillregain
the confidence of international investors, which helps to decrease public
deficits and to reduce wealth losses that resulted from the financial crisis.
Furthermore, the capitalisation of the banking sector will gradually be
strengthened. However, since it takes time for structural reforms to be-
come fully effective, in the crisis countries growth will remain subdued
and unemployment will remain elevated for many years. The following,
more pessimistic scenarios will be defined as deviations from this base-
line.
Greece exit. In this scenario, Greece leaves the euro area, while the
other countries in crisis manage to solve their problems. In this case, the
new Greek currency would devaluate drastically. Due to this event the
value of Greek debt, which is denominated in euro, would at the same
time rise substantially. Hence, Greece would be unable to repay its debt,
and a further haircut on Greek public bonds would be inevitable. Hence,
Slovenia’s public debt would increase, since Slovenia participates in the
esm and in the ecb bond purchase programs. Since neither Slovenian
nor Serbian banks are significantly engaged in Greece, in this scenario
nosubstantiallossesofSlovenianorSerbianbanksarelikely.Hence,from
this side there is no reason to expectreductions in credit supply in Slove-
nia or Serbia. However, Greek banks are engaged in Serbia with a share
of 15 percent of total assets. If Greece leaves the euro area, it can be ex-
pected that Greek banks come under pressure due to the devaluation
of the currency and the ensuing write-downs on their Greek sovereign
bonds. Hence, it is assumed that upon Greece’s exit from the euro area
Greek banks will reduce their exposure abroad which could result in a
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decrease of credit availability in Serbia. For Slovenia, such consequences
would not occur, since Greek banks are not engaged in Slovenia. But also
other Western European banks are present in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. These banks would have to write down their Greek debt as well.
T h i sm a yi m p a c tu p o nc r e d i ta v a i l a b i l i t yi nt h ec o u n t r i e si nw h i c ht h e y
are engaged. While in Slovenia Western European banks own about 20
p e r c e n to fa l lb a n ka s s e t s ,i nS e r b i at h e ya c c o u n tf o rm o r et h a n7 0p e r -
cent of the bank assets.
giips exit. In a highly pessimistic and unlikely scenario, it is assumed
that all peripheral countries with structural problems, i.e. the so-called
giips countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain leave the euro
area. The remaining countries keep the common currency. In this sce-
nario, the exit countries will be unable to repay large partsof their public
debt, since their respective currencies would devaluate drastically, push-
ing up their public debt which is denominated in euro. Investors would
claim significantly higher risk premia to compensate for the increased
risk of default of these countries. In Spain, the continuous fall of real es-
tate prices aggravates the problems of the banks with non-performing
loans, requiring higher public capital injections. In this scenario, also in
Italy public resistance against the drastic government spending cuts and
tax hikes rises, rendering it impossible for the government to implement
the necessary budget consolidation measures. For this scenario, it is ir-
relevant whether the countries under consideration leave the euro area
under their own deliberation or whether they are forced to leave because
the euro area partners are no longer willing to finance the drastically in-
creasing financial needs of these countries by additional esm loans or
ecb bond purchases. Regarding the economic consequences for Slove-
niaandSerbia,itisalsonotrelevantwhethereachoftheexitingcountries
introduces its own currency or whether they form a ‘Southern euro area,’
since the new currency or currencies would drastically devaluate against
the ‘Northern euro’ in any case. The impact of Italy and Spain leaving
the euro area would be considerable for Slovenia. These two countries
alone account for 80.6 percent (330.7 million euro) of the total amount
of debt securities of the giips countries owned by Slovenian residents.
Moreover, according to the 2012 Financial Stability Review of the Bank
of Slovenia, by the end of March 2012 Slovenian residents (mainly in-
surance companies and banks) held a total of 410.3 million euro in debt
securities from Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, accounting for
8.5 percent of their total investment in foreign debt securities. The share
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of investment in the debt securities of Greece was low, amounting to 2.5
million euro in March 2012.
Total euro area break-up. Finally, in the fourth scenario it is assumed
that the euro area breaks up altogether and all countries introduce their
own currencies. This implies that Slovenia returns to the tolar, Slovenia’s
c u r r e n c yp r i o rt oi t se u r oa r e aa c c e s s i o ni n2 0 0 7 .
Transmission Channels to Slovenia and Serbia
An exit of one or more countries from the euro area would affect the
economies of Slovenia and Serbia via several channels of which reduced
exports and credit constraints might be considered the most important
ones. The reasons for credit constraints differ between the two countries,
as will be described later. Slovenia would also be confronted with addi-
tionalfiscalcosts,causedbywrite-downsoncreditsandguaranteesgiven
bythe eu institutionstothecrisiscountries.Investmentmayinaddition
be affected by reducing the value of collateral available to back credits. In
a business cycle expansion, the ratio of debt to asset values may rise to
such a high level that a business cycle turning point sets in motion a de-
flation of Tobin’s Q, which causes a spiralling decline in credit access and
inthepriceandquantityofcollateralassets.Outputandinvestmentthen
decline because the collateral constraint limits access to working capital
financing (Mendoza 2008). In addition, private consumption is probably
affected by negative wealth effects as in the financial crisis the value of
housingandfinancialwealthdecreasedsubstantially.Thedecreaseofreal
estate prices was particularly severe in Slovenia where a housing bubble
burst which had been fuelled by very low real interest rates in the boom
period prior to the outbreak of the crisis.
To keep the analysis manageable, the empirical investigations have
beenconfinedtothesetransmission channels,which canberegardedthe
quantitatively most important ones for the economies under consider-
ation. In the following, these transmission channels, which have been
accounted for in the simulations, are elaborated in more detail.
international trade
T h em a i nc a u s eo ft h ec u r r e n tp r o b l e m so fs e v e r a le u r oa r e ae c o n o m i e s
is their loss in international price competitiveness, having resulted in an
accumulation of current account deficits. Hence, upon a euro area exit
of these countries, their new currencies would depreciate significantly
against the euro. Based on a Meta study of existing analyses with differ-
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entmethodologies,Bornetal.(2012)concludethatmoststudiesestimate
the depreciation, which is necessary to induce a sizeable improvement
of Greece’s current account to 20 to 30 percent. Based on historical ex-
periences of other countries, the required real depreciation could even
reach 50 percent (Alcidi, Giovannini, and Gros 2012). If Greece stays in
t h ee u r oa r e a ,w a g e sa n dp r i c e sw o u l dh a v et od e c r e a s eb yt h i sa m o u n t .
If Greece leaves the euro area and prices and wages remain constant, the
new Greek currency would depreciate in nominal terms (Seidel 2012).
Based on these considerations, in the scenario of a Greece exit from the
euro area, the ensuing nominal depreciation of the new Greek currency
is assumed to be 30 percent. Although the current account deficits of the
other crisis countries are smaller as compared to Greece, it is assumed
that their respective new currencies would also depreciate by 30 per-
cent against the euro in the scenario of the exit of all giips countries.
Thisdepreciationwouldboostexportsanddecreaseimportsofthecoun-
tries leaving the euro area, since imported goods and services would be-
come much more expensive in the respective domestic currencies. For
thetradingpartnersthisimpliessignificantlylowerexportstotheexiting
countries.
T h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o no ft h er e d u c e di m p o r td e m a n do nS l o v e n i aa n d
Serbiainthe simulations takesaccount ofthe differentinternationaleco-
nomic ties of the two countries. Slovenia has traditionally been closely
linked to the German economy, while Russia and the other countries
from the former Yugoslavia still account for the highest share in Ser-
bia’s trade. Common to both economies is the fact that exports to Greece
only account fora small shareoftheir total exports.An isolated euro area
exit of Greece would thus only have a negligible direct impact on Slove-
nia’s or Serbia’s external trade. Greece accounts for just 0.26 percent of
Slovenia’s and 1.7 percent of Serbia’s exports, respectively. Even if indi-
rect effects are taken into account, Slovenia’s and Serbia’s exports would
be only marginally affected when only Greece leaves the euro area. Indi-
rect effects would be due to the fact that other economies would also be
negatively affected by Greece’s euro area exit, resulting in lower import
demand. The picture would change if all giips countries, i.e. Greece,
Ireland,Italy, Portugal, and Spain would leave the euro area. These coun-
triesabsorb13.6percentofbothSlovenia’sandSerbia’sexports.Italyalone
accounts for about 12 and 11 percent of Slovenia’s and Serbia’s exports,
respectively. Furthermore, an exit of these five countries, including the
two large economies of Italy and Spain, would cause significant drops in
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economic activity and hence import demand in several other countries
(Colijn and van Ark 2012).
credit constraints
BanksfromSloveniaorSerbiawithasubstantialexposureinoneormore
of the crisis countries would incur large negative wealth effects (Petersen
a n dB ö h m e r2 0 1 2 ) .I nt h em o d e l sf o rS l o v e n i aa n dS e r b i a ,w h i c hh a v e
been used for the simulations the banking sectors are not explicitly mod-
elled. It has been assumed that Slovenian or Serbian banks confronted
with write-downs on public bonds of the countries leaving the euro area
would not be able to bear these losses without reducing their balance
sheets.Hence,thesebankswouldhavetobere-capitalisedbythegovern-
ment, similar to the re-capitalisations that have already been necessary
in Slovenia. These injections of public capital raise public debt further.
This would require additional restrictive fiscal policy measures (Eichen-
g r e e n2 0 0 7 ) .F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h eb a n k sw o u l dr e a c tt ot h en e g a t i v ee q u i t y
effectsbyreducingtheircreditsupply,withnegativeconsequencesforthe
financing of investment.
Since neither Slovenian nor Serbian banks are significantly engaged
in Greece, in this scenario no substantial losses of Slovenian or Serbian
banks are likely. Hence, from this side there is no reason to expect reduc-
tionsincreditsupplyinSloveniaorSerbia.H owever ,Greekbanksareen-
gaged in Serbia, andif Greeceleaves the euro areait canbe expectedthat
Greek banks come under pressure due to the devaluation of the currency
andtheensuingwrite-downsontheirGreeksovereignbonds.Hence,itis
assumed that upon Greece’s exit from the euro area Greek banks reduce
their exposure abroad, which could result in a decrease of credit avail-
ability in Serbia. For Slovenia, such consequences would not occur, since
Greek banks are not engaged in Slovenia.
In the scenario with a euro area exit of Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain in addition to Greece, much more adverse effects on credit sup-
ply would have to be expected. In particular, Italy has large banks with
significant assets in Slovenia and Serbia. These banks, such as UniCredit
and Intesa Sanpaolo, have an especially high giips exposure. Upon an
exit of Italy and other countries their banks would incur losses on their
equities,mainlyduetotheensuingdevaluationofthenewdomesticcur-
rencies. Hence, it is assumed that these banks would reduce their activi-
ties abroad, which for this paper would imply decreasing credit supply in
Slovenia and Serbia. The banks under majority foreign ownership rely to
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a large extent on the coverage of loans through their parent bank fund-
ing, e.g. in Slovenia this ratio amounts to about 50 percent. In addition,
as far as Slovenian or Serbian banks are engaged in the countries leav-
ing the euro area, they would also be confronted with losses on their as-
sets, which would induce them to reduce their balance sheets, implying
a drop in credit supply. Slovenian residents’ investment in debt securities
(mainly bank and government bonds) of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece
and Spain is concentrated in the insurance and banking sectors. Govern-
ment bonds from the periphery countries account for 6 percent of the
Slovenianbankingsystem’sportfolioofdebtsecurities,whilebankbonds
account for slightly less than 10 percent. The equivalent figures for the
insurancesectorareabout10percentforgovernmentbondsand11.5per-
centforbankbonds,respectively .Alreadyin2011,theworseningsituation
on the euro area interbank market was mirrored by a drop of 36 percent
in the stock of new loans, raised by Slovenian banks from banks in the
rest of the world. This sharp fallshows Slovenian banks’ limited access to
the international financial markets coupled with lower credit availability
in the economy.
additional public debt (slovenia)
As a euro area member state that participates in the European Stability
Mechanism and via its capital subscriptions in the ecb bond purchase
programs,Sloveniawouldsufferfromirrecoverableloansandguarantees
given to the crisis countries (Alcidi, Giovannini, and Gros 2012). Since
it is reasonable to assume that countries leaving the euro area would at
least partly default, the creditors would have to write down their loans.
Hence, public debt would increase. Slovenia itself struggles with prob-
lems in the banking sector, since the financial crisis caused a bursting of
ahousingbubble,andmanybanksarenowconfrontedwithbadloansand
debt write-offs. For this reason, the public sector had to inject consider-
ableamountsintosomelargebankssoastostrengthentheircapitalbasis.
ThishasalreadyconsiderablydrivenuppublicdebtinSlovenia.Thedebt
ratio rose from 22 percent in 2008 to 54 percent in 2012. Public debt in
Sloveniaincreasedalsoduetothecentre-leftgovernmentdecisiontocon-
siderably increase social transfers in order to cushion the impact of the
crisis, which reached Slovenia with some delay (e.g. Institute of Macroe-
conomic Analysis and Development 2012). From 2009 to 2011, the gen-
eral government realised a budget deficit of around 6 percent in relation
to gdp, followed by only a slight improvement to 4 percent in 2012. Due
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todecliningreal gdp in2012and2013andonlyasluggishrecoveryafter-
wards, the European Commission (2013) expects that the budget deficit
widensagain,andasaresultthedebtratiocouldrisefurthertomorethan
6 6p e r c e n to fgdpi n2 0 1 4 ,e v e nw i t h o u ta n ya d d i t i o n a ld e b ta c c u m u l a -
tionduetowrite-downson esm loansoradditionalcapitalsubscriptions
to the ecb.
The Macroeconomic Models for Slovenia and Serbia
Thesimulationsofthemacroeconomicconsequencesofdifferentscenar-
iosofthefutureeuroareadevelopmentforSloveniaandSerbiahavebeen
performed with macroeconometric models for these two countries. Both
models have similar structures and will be verbally described in this sec-
tion. A detailed description of a previous version of the model for Serbia
maybefoundinWeyerstrassandGrozea-Helmenstein(2013).Earlierver-
sions of the model for Slovenia have been described in e.g. Weyerstrass
and Neck (2008) and Weyerstrass (2011). The model for Serbia has been
used several times to generate forecasts for the Serbian economy (e.g.
Grozea-Helmenstein et al. 2012). The model for Slovenia has been ap-
pliedinseveralstudiestoanalysevariousaspectsofSlovenia’scontinuous
European integration process. In a recent paper, Neck, Haber, and Wey-
erstrass(2012)analysethedesignofmacroeconomicpoliciesforSlovenia
on its way into the euro area.
A sd e s c r i b e di nd e t a i li nW e y e r s t r a s s( 2 0 1 1 ) ,w e a ke x o g e n e i t yo ft h e
right-hand side variables of a structural econometric model is required
for efficient estimation and hypothesis testing. Weak exogeneity means
that no useful information is lost when other variables are made con-
ditional on these variables without specifying their generating process.
Strong exogeneity is the combination of weak exogeneity and Granger
non-causality. It ensures valid forecasting of the endogenous variables,
conditional on assumptions about the explanatory variables. Finally, su-
perexogeneityrequiresweakexogeneityofthemodelvariablesandstruc-
tural invariance. A conditional model is structurally invariant if all pa-
rameters are invariant to changes in the distribution of the condition-
ing variables. Super exogeneity is required for policy analyses, since such
analyses assume that the parameters of the model do not change when
the policy regime changes. The super-exogeneity condition may be in-
vestigated using a test for weak exogeneity combined with a test for pa-
rameter invariance. The cusum test and a Chow breakpoint test were
performedto test the Slovenian modelfor parameterstability. For almost
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allbehaviouralequations,thetestsindicatethattheparametershavebeen
stable over time. Granger causality tests indicate that in almost all equa-
tions the right-hand side variables, i.e. the explanatory variables, are in-
deed not directly influenced by the endogenous variables. Based on the
Granger causality and parameter stability tests, the model for Slovenia
can be viewed as being appropriate for both forecasting and policy anal-
ysis, although it cannot be excluded that future changes in the policy
regimes might induce private agents to change their behaviour in a dif-
fer en twa ythantheydidinthepast(seeW eyerstrass2011).F o rthemodel
for Serbia, only parts of these tests have been performed. Model evalua-
t i o n sb a s e do nt h em e a na b s o l u t ep e r c e n t a g ee r r o ra n dT h e i l ’ si n e q u a l i t y
coefficient, indicate that the ability of the macroeconometric model for
Serbia to replicate the endogenous variables can be regarded as satisfac-
tory (Weyerstrass and Grozea-Helmenstein 2013). Due to the shortness
of the time series, particularly for Serbia, formal tests for Heteroscedas-
ticity were refrained from, since they are designed for large samples. In
addition, the estimatedcoefficients arevalid even under heteroscedastic-
ity,andanymethodsfordealingwithheteroscedasticitylikeinstrumental
variables would also require longer time series without structuralbreaks.
Finally, when setting up the equations, theoretical considerations have
beengivenpriorityoverstatisticalpropertieswhenchoosingthevariables
a n df u n c t i o n a lf o r mo ft h ee q u a t i o n s .
Unit root tests identify most variables as integrated of order one, i.e.
the variables are non-stationary in levels, but the first differences are sta-
tionary. In many cases, the results of the unit root tests are inconclusive.
This problem is caused by the shortness of the time series and by the
factthatsomequarterlytimeserieshadtobederivedfromtherespective
annual figures. Based on the results of the unit root test, for almost all
behaviouralequationserrorcorrectionmodels(ecm)werechosenasthe
most appropriate modelling technique for both country models, despite
the short history of reliable time series especially for Serbian macroeco-
nomic data.
The macroeconomic models for Slovenia and Serbia combine Key-
nesian and neoclassical elements. The former determine the short and
medium run solutions in the sense that the models are demand-driven
andpersistentdisequilibriainthegoodsandlabourmarketsarepossible.
The supply side incorporatesneoclassical features. The modelsare based
ontheconventionalaggregatesupply/aggregatedemand(as-ad)frame-
work, where the long-run relationships have mainly been chosen on the
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basis of theoretical considerations. The wage-price system is based on a
bargaining model between employers and trade unions (Layard, Nickell,
andJackman1991).Inthislabourmarketmodel,pricesaresetasmark-up
over marginal costs. The wage-setting rule is based on a Nash bargaining
processtha tproducesanexpectedrealwagetha tvariesin verselywiththe
unemployment rate. As unemployment falls, insiders know that, should
they be laid off, they could quickly find work elsewhere. This raises the
value of their fall-back point. The econometric estimations are based on
quarterly data for the period 1997q1 to 2011q4 (Serbia), and 1995q1 until
2011q4 (Slovenia), respectively. However, for some variables the time se-
ries for Serbia start later. In particular,for this country quarterly time se-
riesforthepublicsectorareonlyavailablefrom2003q1onwards.Further-
more, for some macroeconomic aggregates quarterly data are not avail-
able for Serbia. In these cases, quarterly data were derived from the re-
spective annual aggregates by recurrence to related variables for which
higher-frequency data have been available.
In the supply blocks of the models, potential gdp is determined. The
estimation of potential output is based on a Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale and with the production factors
labour, capital and autonomous technical progress. Since potential gdp
is a measure of the long-run production possibilities of an economy, it
is the long-run trends rather than the actual realisations of the produc-
tion factors that enter the production function. Autonomous technical
progress is defined as total factor productivity (tfp). Trend employment
iscalculatedbysubtractingnaturalorstructuralunemploymentfromthe
labourforce.Sincestructuralunemploymentisnon-observable,thisvari-
able has to be approximated. In the models for Slovenia and for Serbia,
this is done by applying a Hodrick-Prescott (hp) filter to the actual un-
employment rate in order to extract the trend. Structural unemployment
is then defined as the long-run trend in actual unemployment. In order
to endogenise the nairu, it is modelled as a moving average (ma) pro-
cess. Total factor productivity (tfp) is calculated as the Solow residual,
i.e.thatpartofthechangeinreal gdp thatisnotduetoincreasedlabour
and capital input, where both production factors are weighted with their
production elasticities, i.e. 0.35 for the capital stock and 0.65 for labour,
respectively.Theactual tfp seriesissmoothedbyapplyingtheHodrick-
P r e s c o t tfi l t e rs oa st or e m o v es h o r t - r u nfl u c t u a t i o n st h a ta r ec a u s e db y
the business cycle or by any short-run shocks.
On the demand side, the models comprise the labour, goods, mone-
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tary and foreign exchange markets. Hence, the models are made up of
equations for the gdp expenditure components (private and public con-
sumption, capital formation, exports, and imports), prices, wages, em-
ployment,unemployment,interestrates,andexchangerates.Inaddition,
themostimportantrevenueandexpenditureitemsoftheSerbianandthe
Slovenian general governments, respectively, are modelled. Consump-
tion of private households depends on current real disposable income
(the Keynesian consumption theory), and on the real long-term interest
rate.Thelatterincorporatesthepermanentincomehypothesisaccording
to which it is the expected future rather than current income, which is
relevant for private consumption. Discounted future income may be ap-
proximatedbywealth.LackingreliabledataonprivatewealthinSlovenia
and in Serbia, in the models wealth effects are approximated by the real
long-terminterestrate.Theinterestrateasadeterminantofconsumption
accounts also for the fact that some households finance partof their con-
sumptionviabankcredits,andfortheintertemporaldecisionontheallo-
cation of income to consumption in the present period and in the future.
Gross fixed capital formation is undertaken to renew the capital stock
andto adjust it tochangesin finaldemand.Hence,the acceleratortheory
stipulatesthatchangesindemanddeterminefixedcapitalformation.Ac-
cording to theories focussing on the profitability of investment projects,
thevalueofthecapitalstockequalsthediscountedfutureincomethatcan
be generated by employing the capital stock. Therefore, the interest rate,
which is used to discount future income, is crucial for the profitability of
an investment project. The market interest rate is formed on the basis of
the time preferences of the individual investors. According to this strand
oftheories,investmentisafunctionoftherealinterestrate.Theneoclas-
sical investment theory combines the investment determinants accord-
ing to the accelerator hypothesis and profitability considerations. In this
case, the optimal capital stock equalises the marginal revenue product of
capital and the user cost of capital. In the models for Slovenia and for
Serbia, due to data availability as well as significance and sign of the esti-
mated coefficients, the user cost of capital is approximated solely by the
reallong-terminterestrate.Inparticulartimeseriesofcompanytaxation,
which would be relevantfor investment decisions, arelacking. Exportsof
goods and services depend on international demand and on the relative
price of domestic exports on the world market. Worldwide demand is
approximated by world trade, while the real effective exchange rate ac-
counts for price effects. Imports of goods and services depend on total
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demand in Serbia and in Slovenia, respectively, and on relative prices.
Similar to exports, relative prices are approximated by the real effective
exchange rates of Serbia and of Slovenia, respectively. Labour demand
by companies (i.e. actual employment) is influenced by the production
level (real gdp) and by labour costs. In the models, labour costs consist
o ft h ea v e r a g eg r o s sw a g ep e re m p l o y e e .D u et ot h el i m i t e da v a i l a b i l i t y
of reliable data, in the model for Serbia labour supply by private house-
holds is exogenous. In contrast, in the Slovenian model labour supply
is made endogenous via the labour force participation rate, which de-
pendsontherealnetwage,implying thatthesubstitutioneffectofhigher
wagesdo mina teso vertheinco meeffect.Theco nsumerp riceindex(cpi)
is related to internal and external determinants. The most important in-
ternal cost-push factors are wages. In addition, rising capacity utilisation
exerts upward pressure on prices. Moreover, in the long run the cpi in
Serbia is positively influenced by the money stock, supporting the Mon-
etarist view according to which inflation is ultimately a monetary phe-
nomenon. As an important external cost factor, the oil price in dinar en-
ters the consumer price equation in the Serbian model. In the model for
Slovenia,totalimportpricesareincludedastheexternalcostcomponent.
The gdp deflatorandotherdeflatorsarelinkedtothedevelopmentofthe
consumer price index. In an extended Phillips curve equation, the wage
rate is negatively influenced by the difference between the actual unem-
ployment rate and the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,
or the nairu. In addition, wages are positively influenced by consumer
prices and by labour productivity. On the financial market, interest rates
and exchange rates are determined. Since the National Bank of Serbia
(nbs) runs an independent monetary policy, the nbs interest rate for
open market operations has been included in the Serbian model as the
relevant monetary policy instrument. The model contains a Taylor rule
type equation, i.e. the nbs interest rate depends positively on the infla-
tion rate and on the output gap in Serbia. This approach implies that the
National Bank of Serbia follows both an inflation and an output target.
Real money demand is positively influenced by real gdp and negatively
bythe long-term interest rate.Since Slovenia as a euro areamemberstate
cannotpursueanindependentmonetarypolicy ,inthemodelforSlovenia
theshort-terminterestrateissolelydeterminedbythethreemonths eu-
ribor. In term structure equations, in both models the respective long-
terminterestratesdependontheshort-terminterestrates.Thelong-term
market interest rates then determine the respective implicit interest rates
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on outstanding public debt. The nominal effective exchange rate of the
Serbian dinar is determined by important bilateral exchange rates. Since
the countries of the euro area are Serbia’s most important trading part-
ners, the nominal effective exchange rate of the Serbian dinar is mainly
determined by the exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro. The real effective ex-
change rate is influenced by the nominal effective exchange rate and by
pricedevelopments.In theSerbianmodel,the latterare approximatedby
the inflation rate in Serbia. In theory, it is the inflation differential rather
t h a ne x c l u s i v e l yi n fl a t i o ni nS e r b i at h a tm a t t e r s .H o w e v e r ,i tw o u l dh a v e
been difficult to construct an international inflation rate consistent with
the regional pattern of Serbia’s external trade as reflected in the effective
exchangerate.Therefore,intherealeffectiveexchangerateequationonly
inflation in Serbia has been included in addition to the nominal effective
exchange rate. In the model for Slovenia, the foreign exchange market
is modelled by an equation for the real effective exchange rate against a
group of 41 countries. To take developments before Slovenia’s euro area
accession in 2007 into account, the bilateral exchange rate between the
Slovenian tolar and the euro is included as an explanatory variable. In
addition, the exchange rate between the euro and the us dollar, the con-
sumer price index (cpi) in Slovenia and the inflation rate are considered
as further explanatory variables. In the public sector blocks, the models
contain behavioural equations for the most important revenue and ex-
penditure items of the consolidated general governments of Slovenia and
Serbia, respectively.
Assumptions for the Simulations and Their Implementation
in the Macromodels
This section presents the implementation of the scenarios and transmis-
sion channels to Slovenia and Serbia, respectively, for the model simula-
tions, which run over the period 2013 to 2017. The unprecedented nature
of the different scenarios of the possible future of the euro area implies
that the error margins of the calibrations are necessarily wide; they in-
v o l v eala r g erth a nu s uale lem en to fa rtra th erth a nsci en ce .N ev erth e le s s ,
w eb e l i e v et h a tw h a tf o l l o w sg i v e ss o m eg u i d a n c eo ft h eb r o a do r d e r so f
magnitude of the macroeconomic consequences in the different scenar-
ios. The same qualification was also made by Cliffe (2011) and Cliffe et
al. (2010) in their attempt to quantify the economic costs of a Greek exit
f r o mt h ee u r oa r e ao rac o m p l e t ee u r oa r e ab r e a k - u p .C l i ff ee ta l .( 2 0 1 0 )
e s t i m a t et h ec u m u l a t i v el o s so fo u t p u ti nt h efi r s tt w oy e a r sa tc l o s et o
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10 percent of euro area output. In a revised assessment, Cliffe (2011) esti-
mates this cumulative loss in the first two years at over 12 percent of euro
area gdp.
For all simulations, it is assumed that the parameters of the macroe-
conomic models remain stable. This implies the supposition that con-
sumers and companies do not change their fundamental behaviour (e.g.
the marginal propensity to consume or the interest rate elasticity of in-
vestment) in response to the crisis. While it may be possible that some
consumersorcompanieschangetheirbehaviourasaresponsetosuchan
economic shock, the direction and magnitude of these possible changes
areimpossibletogaugeexante.Hence,itiscommoninmodelsimulation
studies to assume parameterstability, even in simulations of largeadjust-
ments like deleveraging in the Spanish economy (In ’t Veld et al. 2012),
or in simulations of structural reforms (e.g. Vogel 2012) which by their
nature should have long-lasting effects.
The most obvious transmission channel is international trade, result-
ing in lower exports from Slovenia and Serbia to the countries leaving
theeuroarea.Inaddition,banksmighthavetoreducetheircreditsupply
so as to deleverage as they would incur losses on their holdings of pub-
lic bonds. This reduced credit availability would negatively affect gross
fixed capital formation. Slovenia would in addition be confronted with
an increase of public debt as the countries leaving the euro area would
be unable to repay their financial assistance in part or in full. Hence, the
Slovenian government would have to write-down its loans and guaran-
teeswhichimpliesanincreaseinpublicdebt.AsSlovenia’s publicindebt-
edness has already increased sharply during the economic and financial
crisis, this additional debt would necessitate further fiscal consolidation
efforts. This consolidation is implemented by a reduction of public con-
sumption.
Table 1 shows Slovenia’s exposure to the euro area peripheral coun-
tries. The calculations are based on those undertaken by the German ifo
Institute for Germany. Slovenia’s exposure is derived from the potential
bail-out funds plus Target2 claims within the Eurosystem.
T h ec a l c u l a t i o no ft h eS l o v e n i a ns h a r ei nt h ee x p o s u r ei sd i ff e r e n tf o r
the various items. For the Target2 liabilities of the crisis countries, Slove-
nia’s exposure is based on the country’s share of 0.47 percent of the ecb
capital. However, should one or more of the crisis countries become in-
solvent and leave the euro area, only the remaining euro area countries
w o u l db ee x p o s e dt ot h eT a r g e tl i a b i l i t i e s .I nt h i sc a s e ,S l o v e n i aw o u l d
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table 1 Slovenia’s public exposure for the euro area scenarios in billion euro
Item Greece exit giips exit Euro area break-up
esm capital . . .
esm guarantees . . .
Greece  . . .
Greece  . . .
Ireland — . .
Portugal — . .
imf not yet disbursed . . .
ecb Target . . .
ecm smp . . .
Total . . .
notes Authors’ calculations based on data from http://www.cesifo-group
.de/ifoHome/policy/Haftungspegel.html.
be liable for 0.48 percent of the total exposure if only Greece leaves the
euro area. Should in addition to Greece also Portugal, Ireland, Italy and
S pa i ne x i tth ee u r oa r ea ,S l o v e n i a ’ ss h a r ew o ul dri set o0 . 7 4pe r c e n t .S i n c e
the central banks of all euro area countries, including those of the cri-
sis countries themselves, are involved in the ecb public bond purchases,
Slovenia’s share is also calculated on the basis of the general ecb capi-
tal key and consequently totals around 0.47 percent. To the first bailout
program for Greece, Slovenia contributed bilateral loans amounting to
243.5 million euro. Regarding the second programme for Greece, Slove-
nia would be liable for around 0.5 percent of the European Financial Sta-
bilityFund(efsf)loans.ThisagainrepresentsSlovenia’sshareaccording
to the capital key of the euro area countries excluding the crisis coun-
tries. Slovenia’s part of the two International Monetary Fund (imf) bail-
out packages granted at the same time is in line with its contribution
to the imf’s capital of 0.12 percent. The efsf and the imf contributed
t h es a m es h a r eo fb a i l - o u tf u n d sf o rI r e l a n da n dP o r t u g a la st h e yd i dt o
Greece.Sloveniacontributedabout0.3percenttothefundsalreadymade
available by the esm since this corresponds to Slovenia’s current share of
t h er e v e n u e si nt h ee ub u d g e t .S i n c et h ee s md o e sn o tp r o v i d ef o ra n y
specific liability on the part of member countries for concrete financial
assistance, the Slovenian share in the programme to re-capitalise Span-
ish banks is included in Slovenia’s overall exposure to the esm. The esm
permanent bail-out fund has a capital of 700 billion euro. Slovenia’s ex-
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posure is calculated from its share of 0.43 percent. The capital to be paid
in (0.34 billion euro) and the available capital (2.65 billion euro) are rep-
resented separately. For the simulations it is assumed that upon an exit
of a country from the euro area, the Slovenian government would have
t ow r i t ed o w na l li t sc l a i m st ot h er e s p e c t i v ec o u n t r y .A c c o r d i n gt ot a -
ble 1, this would push up Slovenia’s public debt level by 5.6 billion euro
if only Greece leaves the euro area and by 12.53 billion euro if all giips
countries exit or if the euro area completely breaks up. It is further as-
sumed that this would happen at the end of 2012, i.e. before the start of
the simulation period. The additional public debt would then be repaid
by reducing public consumption linearly by one fifth of the additional
debt in each of the five simulation years. This implies that additional in-
terest payments for this part of public debt that is repaid later and not
immediately in the first year are not taken into account. Hence, in the
Greek exit scenario, public consumption is reduced by 1.12 billion euro
per year and by 2.51 billion euro p.a. in the other two scenarios. The re-
duction in public consumption would exert substantial negative macroe-
conomic effects. Before the outbreak of the financial and economic cri-
s i s ,i nt h el i t e r a t u r eo nfi s c a lp o l i c ye ff e c t si th a db e e nw i d e l ya c c e p t e d
that multipliers of public consumption are well below 1, in particular due
t oc r o w d i n go u t ,m a i n l yv i ah i g h e ri n t e r e s tr a t e s ,c a u s i n gb o t had e c l i n e
in investment and appreciation of the domestic currency with negative
i m p a c t so ne x p o r t s .H o w e v e r ,i nt h ec u r r e n te n v i r o n m e n to fs u b s t a n t i a l
economic slack, monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound,
and synchronised fiscal adjustment across numerous economies, mul-
tipliers may be well above 1 (see, e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
2012; Batini, Callegari, and Melina 2012; International Monetary Fund
2012a; 2012b).
For the implementation of the export reduction, following Born et al.
(2012) it is assumed that the currencies of the exiting countries would
devaluate by 30 percent against the euro. The same devaluation rate is
assumed for the exchange rates between the exiting countries and the
Serbian dinar. If the necessary adjustment of the trade balance of the
crisis countries happens entirely via volumes, the imports of the respec-
tive countries would decline by 30 percent. If this is spread evenly across
goods and trade partners, this implies that Slovenia’s and Serbia’s ex-
portstothesecountrieswouldalsodecreaseby30percent.Asmentioned
above, Greece accounts for 0.26 percent of Slovenia’s exports and for 1.7
percent of Serbia’s exports. Hence, the assumed direct effect is set to an
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export reduction by 30 percent of 0.26 percent for Slovenia and to 30
percent of 1.7 percent for Serbia, respectively, in the Greek exit scenario.
T h et o t a le x p o r ts h a r eo fa l lg i i p sc o u n t r i e s ,i .e .G r e e c e ,I r e l a n d ,I t a l y ,
Portugal and Spain equals 13.6 percent both for Slovenia and for Serbia.
A c c o r d i n g l y ,t h ed i r e c te ff e c ti ss e tt oa ne x p o r tr e d u c t i o no f3 0p e r c e n t
of 13.6 percent for both countries in the more extreme scenario of a euro
areaexitofthe giips countries.Forthescenarioofaeuroareabreak-up,
it is assumed that the direct impacts on exports are three times as large
as in the giips exit scenario. As other trading partners of the countries
leaving the euro area would also experience a decline in economic activ-
ity,theywouldneedlessimportsaswell,whichalsoaffectsSlovenia’sand
Serbia’sexports.Thisadditionalindirecteffectisassumedat50percentof
the direct effects. It might be however objected that the assumption that
the indirect effects make up half of the direct effect, is rather arbitrary.
Of course any larger or smaller indirect effect would also be conceivable.
However, a larger effect seems less likely since more distant regions of
the world economy like the us or Asia would probably be affected only
to a lesser extent, and hence exports to this regions would only decline
s l i g h t l y .I ti sf u r t h e r m o r ea s s u m e dt h a tt h el a r g e s tn e g a t i v ee ff e c to fa
euro area exit of one or more countries would last for two years. For
the third year of the simulation period, 75 percent of the original effect
i sa s s u m e d .F o rt h ef o u r t hy e a r ,af u r t h e rr e d u c t i o nt o5 0p e r c e n to ft h e
originalimpactistaken,andforthefinalyearareturntothebaselinepath
isassumed.Thefinalexogenousreductionofexports(ascomparedtothe
baseline simulation) in the three euro area scenarios can be summarised
as follows. 2013 and 2014: Greece exit: Slovenia (slo) 0.12, Serbia (srb)
0.77. giips exit: slo and srb 6.1.Euroareabreak-up: slo and srb
18.4. 2015: Greece exit: slo 0.09, srb 0.57. giips exit: slo and
srb 4.6. Euro area break-up: slo and srb 13.8. 2016: Greece exit:
slo 0.06, srb 0.38. giips exit: slo and srb 3.1.Euroareabreak-
up: slo and srb 9.2. Finally, it is expected that in 2017 exports return
to their baseline path, implying that their level is permanently lower as
compared to the baseline.
Finally, it is expected that investment would be negatively affected
in the scenarios involving the euro area exit of one or more countries.
Clearly, companies would invest less in reaction to the decline in fi-
nal demand. However, an additional negative effect can be expected.
As banks incur losses of their wealth since they have to write-down
on public bonds of the exiting countries, they might be forced to re-
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duce their credit exposure. This lower credit availability would impair
those investment projects that are financed by bank credit. According
to data from the Slovenian and the Serbian National Banks, about 40
percent of all company investment is financed by bank credit. Regarding
the credit supply, it is assumed that bank credit availability in Slovenia
and in Serbia would decline by 5 percent and by 10 percent, respectively,
if only Greece leaves the euro area. In the giips exit scenario, the as-
s u m e dc r e d i tr a t i o n i n gi ss e ta t2 0p e r c e n ti nS l o v e n i aa n d3 0p e r c e n t
in Serbia, respectively. Finally, for the most dramatic scenario of a total
euro area break-up, the corresponding figures are 30 percent in Slove-
nia and 50 percent in Serbia. For Serbia, larger impacts on credit supply
are assumed so as to account for the larger engagement of banks from
the crisis countries in Serbia. Following these calculations and assump-
tions,investmentisadditionallyreducedbytheassumeddeclineincredit
s u p p l y ,m u l t i p l i e db yt h es h a r eo fb a n kfi n a n c i n go fi n v e s t m e n t( i .e .4 0
percent). Similar to the implementation of the export reduction, it is
assumed that the largest impact lasts for the first two years and then
d r o p st o7 5p e r c e n ti nt h et h i r dy e a ra n dt o5 0p e r c e n ti nt h ef o u r t hy e a r .
In the fifth year, the additional negative impact on investment is set to
zero. The final exogenous reduction of gross fixed capital formation in
the three euro area scenarios is summarised as follows: 2013 and 2014:
Greece exit: Slovenia 2, Serbia 4. giips exit: Slovenia 8, Serbia 12.
Euro area break-up: Slovenia 12, Serbia 20. 2015: Greece exit: slo
1.5, Serbia 3 . giips exit: slo 6, srb 9. Euro area break-up: slo
9, srb 15. 2016: Greece exit: slo 1.5, Serbia 3. giips exit: slo
4, srb 6. Euro area break-up: slo 6, srb 10. As in the case of
exports, it is expected that from 2017 onwards investment returns to its
baseline path, implying that their level is permanently lower as com-
pared to the baseline scenario of an orderly resolution of the euro area
crisis.
To summarise the assumptions behind the simulations and their im-
plementation in the macromodels for Slovenia and Serbia, real exports
and real investment (which are determined endogenously in both mod-
els) are reduced via add factors. Furthermore, in the case of Slovenia the
public debt level is exogenously increased once to account for the addi-
tional public debt resulting from the write down on public assistance to
countries leaving the euro area and defaulting. Government consump-
tionintheSlovenianmodelisthenreducedsoastorecovertheadditional
public debt incurred upon defaults of the crisis countries.
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Effects of the Euro Area Scenarios on the Economies
of Slovenia and Serbia
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the macroeconomic consequences of the differ-
ent scenarios regarding the future development of the euro area. The ta-
bles depict the deviations from the baseline scenario in which no cur-
rent member state leaves the euro area. For all variables, assumptions re-
garding the most important exogenous variables (world trade, oil price,
exchange rates, fiscal policy instruments) have been chosen in such a
way that the baseline simulation results come close to the most recent
forecasts of the European Commission, the oecd and the imf for the
economiesofSloveniaandSerbia.Thebaselineresultsthemselvesarenot
reported here since we are exclusively interested in deviations from the
baseline in the different euro area scenarios.
Following the assumptions and definitions of the scenarios, the maxi-
mum effect occurs in the second simulation year, i.e. in 2014. In all sce-
narios, exports and investment are those demand components that de-
crease the most. Exports are affected directly via the trade channel. In-
vestment is negatively affected via two channels. Firstly, the decline in
demand results in lower capacity utilisation, inducing companies to cut
back their investment plans. Secondly, it is assumed that private banks
areforcedtoreducetheircreditsupplyasareactiontothewrite-downon
their assets as the value of their public bonds declines. Due to the larger
engagementofbanksfromthe eu peripheralcountriesinSerbiaascom-
pared to Slovenia, Serbia would be affected more by a decrease in credit
s u p p l y .H e n c e ,a l s oi n v e s t m e n td e c l i n e sm o r ei nS e r b i a .T h ed e c l i n eo f
gdp is smaller than the decrease of exports and investment since lower
domesticdemandreducesalsoimports.Sloveniaisinadditionaffectedby
anincreaseinpublicdebtasitisassumedthatthosecountriesthathaveto
leavetheeuro areawouldnotbeabletorepaytheirfinancialassistanceto
the other eu countries, the esm, the imf, and the ecb. For the simula-
tions, it is assumed that those write-downs would push-up public debt at
theendof2012,necessitatinganadditionalfiscalconsolidationbyreduc-
ing public consumption over the following years. This consolidation is
implementedin such a way that atthe endof the five-year simulation pe-
riodtheadditionalpublicdebtiscompensatedbythelowerpublicspend-
ing. However, in both countries public debt is higher than in the baseline
s i m u l a t i o n ,b o t hi na b s o l u t et e r m sa n di nr e l a t i o nt ogdp .T h i si sc a u s e d
by the working of the automatic stabilisers. Lower domestic demand and
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employment causes declining tax revenues, while rising unemployment
leadstohigherspendingonunemploymentbenefits.Thedebtratioisad-
ditionally pushed up by the decrease in the denominator, i.e. in nominal
gdp.Duetotheworkingoftheautomaticstabilisers,alsothebudgetbal-
ancedeterioratesinbothcountries.However,inSloveniatheeffectofthe
additional consolidation dominates, hence the budget balance improves
over the entire simulation horizon in Slovenia.
IncontrasttoanisolatedGreekexit(table2),aeuroareaexitofGreece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (giips) (table 3), and in particular a
total euro area break-up (table 4) would have dramatic negative conse-
quences for Slovenia and for Serbia. In the worst case, real gdp might
shrink by almost 10 percent in Slovenia and by 6 percent in Serbia, re-
specti v el y .Thisisca usedb yaco lla pseo fexpo rtsb ymo r etha n18per cen t
and of investment by around 30 percent. Interestingly, at the end of the
simulationperiod,fixedcapitalformationinSerbiaisevenhigherthanin
thebaseline.Thisrecoverycanbeexplainedbytheassumptionthatcredit
supply returns to the baseline in the final year of the simulation period.
Hence,companiesarethenabletoundertakeinvestment,whichtheyhad
to postpone during the crisis. Also real exports recover and exceed their
baseline levels in the final year of the simulation period. This is brought
aboutbyarealdevaluationoftheSlovenianandSerbiancurrencieswhich
resultsfromthedeclineinwagesandpricesrelativetothebaseline.Inthe
case of an exit of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, employment
would decline by up to 0.9 percent in Slovenia and 0.8 percent in Serbia,
respectively,ascomparedtoasuccessfulresolutionoftheeuroareacrisis.
As a consequence, the unemployment rate would be 0.8 and 0.5 percent-
age points, respectively, higher. The maximum effect of 0.8 percentage
points in Slovenia would occur in the second year, while the largest ef-
fect of 0.5 percentage points in Serbia would be visible in the third year.
Should the euro area break up totally, employment might decline by up
to 2.6 percent in Slovenia and by 1.7 percent in Serbia, respectively. This
would push up the unemployment rate by 2.1 percentage points in Slove-
niaandby1.2percentagepointsinSerbia.ThelargereffectsinSloveniaas
comparedtoSerbiaarecausedbytheadditionalfiscalconsolidation aim-
ing at reducing the higher public debt incurredby the write-down on the
fiscalassistance.Sloveniaparticipatesinthe eu financialrescuepackages
for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, and as a euro area member state
alsointhe ecb Target2system,whileSerbiadoesnotparticipateinthese
programs.
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The fact that Slovenia as an eu and euro area member state partici-
pates in the European assistance programs for the peripheral countries,
while Serbia as a non-eu member country does not, leads to consider-
able effects of the different euro area scenarios for the public finances
of the two countries. In both countries the debt ratio is higher than in
the baseline of a successful crisis resolution, but in Serbia this deterio-
ration is solely caused by the working of the automatic stabilisers, i.e.
lowertaxrevenuesduetothelowerdemandandemploymentandhigher
expenditures for unemployment assistance. These mechanisms result in
a deterioration of the fiscal balance and in a corresponding increase of
t h ed e b tl e v e l .F o rS l o v e n i a ,i th a sb e e na s s u m e dt h a tu p o nae u r oa r e a
e x i tt h er e s p e c t i v ec o u n t r i e sa r en o ta b l et or e p a yt h efi n a n c i a la s s i s -
tance. The write-down of these loans and guarantees pushes up pub-
lic debt in the creditor countries. For the simulations it is assumed that
Slovenia incurs this additional debt at the end of 2012, and the Slove-
niangovernmen tfullycompensatesforthishigherdebtbyreducingpub-
lic consumption accordingly over the simulation horizon. Hence, while
in Serbia the budget balance deteriorates due to the working of the au-
tomatic stabilisers, in Slovenia it improves due to the additional fiscal
consolidation. However, as in Slovenia the automatic stabilisers also re-
sult in lower public revenues and in higher expenditures, in line with
the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, at the end of the five-year
simulation period public debt is still higher than in the baseline. This
happens despite the fact that the additional debt from the write-down
of the loans and guarantees is totally recovered by the reduced public
consumption.
Conclusions
The simulations in this paper show that a euro area exit of Greece alone
would only have marginal effects on the economies of Slovenia and Ser-
b i a .I nc o n t r a s t ,i fi na d d i t i o nt oG r e e c ea l s oI t a l y ,I r e l a n d ,P o r t u g a la n d
Spain leave the euro area or if the euro area even breaks completely up,
the negative economic impacts on Slovenia and on Serbia would be dra-
matic. It is obvious that the scenario of a successful resolution of the cur-
rent problems would be preferable to any scenario involving the exit of
one or more countries from the euro area. If the financial assistance by
the euro area countries and international institutions indeed helps the
peripheralcountriestorestoretheirinternationalcompetitivenessbyim-
plementing painful structural reforms aiming at redirecting capital and
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labour away from the public and import sectors towards the export in-
dustries, the countries will be able to fulfil their financial obligations. In
this case, the loans given by the international community will be fully
repaid, and the guarantees will not become due. In this sense, the esm
loansand ecb interventionswiththeirstrictconditionalityonstructural
reformsinthebeneficiarycountriesmaybeviewedasaninvestmentinto
theabilityofthecountriestorepaytheirloans.Ifthereformprocessesre-
sult in an adjustment of labour markets with more flexible wage bargain-
ing processes which take the international competitiveness with a sin-
g l ec u r r e n cyi n t oa c c o u n t ,t h i sc a na tl e a s tp a r t l yc o m p e n s a t ef o rt h el o s s
of independent exchange rates as adjustment mechanisms. Such reforms
help to avoid new imbalances in the future. The esm as a new European
institution as well as the new macroeconomic imbalance procedure sup-
port these reform and adjustment programs. Should, on the other hand,
thecrisiscountriesfailtosuccessfullyimplementthenecessarystructural
reforms then they will continue to accumulate external deficits. The im-
paired economic growth and the very high unemployment would make
fiscal consolidation impossible. In such a scenario, the countries would
permanentlyneedfinancialassistancefromtheinternationalcommunity
a n de v e n t u a l l yb ef o r c e dt ol e a v et h ee u r oa r e as oa st od e v a l u a t ee x t e r -
nally.Inthiscase,thecountrieswouldalsonotbeabletorepaylargeparts
of their loans. As our simulations have shown, this would have dramatic
consequencesforthetradepartnersandthecreditorcountrieslikeSlove-
nia and Serbia.
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